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Abstract: Objectives: a) To develop a tool to check the level of compliance 
of Spanish football stadiums for the obligatory security measures against 
BOUISPQJDSJTLTC
UPBOBMZTFBOEEFTDSJCFUIFDVSSFOUTFDVSJUZTUBUFPGTJY
football stadiums (two per division).
Methods: A dichotomic tool composed by 150 items divided in 10 categories 
was performed to analyse the situation of Spanish football stadiums. 
Results: There is a big heterogeneity in the percentage of compliance of the 
obligatory security measures among the stadiums analysed,from 2nd Divi-
sion B (52%) to those of 2nd Division (85%) and 1st Division (97%). The 
lower categories implemented are security plans (71%), high risk measures 
(69%), security documentation (67%) and technological means (61%).
Conclusion: /POFPGUIFTJYTUVEJFEDBTFTQFSGPSNFEUIFPGUIFPCMJHB-
tory security measures. The tool used in this study can be useful for them to 
perform all the obligatory security measures. 
Key Words: Assessment, Prevention, Safety, Sporting Arenas, Sporting 
Events, Soccer.
Resumen: Objetivos: a) Desarrollar una herramienta para evaluar el nivel de 
cumplimiento de las medidas de seguridad obligatorias frente a los riesgos 
antrópicos en los estadios de fútbol españoles; b) analizar y describir el nivel 
de seguridad de seis estadios de fútbol (dos por división).
Métodos: Una herramienta de 150 ítems divididos en 10 categorías fue ela-
borada para analizar la situación de los estadios de fútbol españoles.
Resultados: El porcentaje de cumplimiento de las medidas obligatorias entre 
los estadios analizados es muy heterogéneo: 2ª División B (52%) 2ª Divi-
sión (85%) y 1ª División (97%). Las categorías menos implementadas son: 
planes de seguridad (71%), medidas de alto riesgo (69%), documentación 
de seguridad (67%) y medios tecnológicos (61%).
Conclusión: Ninguno de los seis casos estudiados cumplieron con el 100% de 
las medidas de fútbol obligatorias. Esta herramienta puede ser útil para ayu-
dar a alcanzar el cumplimiento de todas las medidas de seguridad obligatorias.
Palabras clave: Evaluación, Prevención, Seguridad, Instalaciones Deporti-
vas, Eventos Deportivos.
Introduction
Security is a key element in the management and organisa-
tion of any event, regardless of its importance or nature. The 
main reason for this is that in case of accident, the service 
PêFSFEUIFGBDJMJUJFTVTFEBOEUIFQFPQMFJOWPMWFEDPVMECF
TFSJPVTMZ BêFDUFE'VSUIFSNPSF BDDPSEJOH UP4QBOJTI SFHV-
lations and authors such as Mason (2014) or Mwanuhehere 
(2009), the event organisers, the service managers and the 
owners of the facilities are in charge of guaranteeing a reason-
able level of security to anyone who takes part in the activity. 
4IBNBOTPVSJ BOE)BTIFNJ.JOBCBE 	
PVUMJOF UIF
principal incidents which throughout the sport’s history have 
EBNBHFEBOEIVSUUIFJSSFQVUBUJPOTVDIBTUIF)JMMTCPSPVHI
USBHFEZPG	4IFïFME6,
ɨFTFFYBNQMFTEFNPOTUSBUF
that if organisers do not manage security of facilities properly, 
the outcome of a security incident can be disastrous for all 
JOWPMWFE*U JT JNQPSUBOUUPFNQIBTJTFUIBU4QBJOBMTPFYQF-
riences such problems and that these incidents do not only 
belong to the past (Lowe, 2014; Robson, 2014).
Any type of security incident which happens nowadays 
usually gets broad media coverage and as a result there may 
be personal damage, economic repercussions and sporting 
penalties (such as points lose or, partial or total closure of 
a stadium), but also a negative touristic impact (Glaesser, 
2004; Mwanuhehere, 2009; York, 2014). For these reasons, 
in the planning stages of any football event, football clubs 
and event organizers need to develop some security measures 
to protect the spectators and the facilities to ensure that the 
activity is conducted properly and safely(Carpenter, 2008; 
)BMM.BSDJBOJ$PPQFS1IJMMJQT4QBBJK5JMB-
SP
)PXFWFS UIF TFDVSJUZNBOBHFNFOUIBT UPCF JO
DPODPSEBODFXJUIFWFOUDVTUPNFSTQFSDFQUJPOTTJODF)BMMFU
al. (2009) found that most of attendees to NASCAR event 
who participated in their study, declared that the security 
NFBTVSFTJGUIFFWFOUBêFDUUPUIFFOKPZNFOUPGJU
When analysing security measures, one of the main prob-
lems is that the word ‘security’ can allude to both the preven-
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tion or the provision of protection from any potential risk 
UIBUDPVMEBêFDUUIFTQPSUJOHTFSWJDF	)BMM
'PSUIBU
reason, and in order to facilitate the comprehension of this 
topic, a risk classification, according to the nature of the pos-
sible anthropic threat, is given below (Table 1).
Table 1. Risk classification according to their nature (own elaboration).
Risk type Description
Structural risk Failure of the structure, poor distribution of spaces, poor or inadequate materials, etc.
Natural risk )VSSJDBOFTTUPSNTìPPETFUD
Occupational risk Occupational illness and injury.
Anthropic risk Actions from people (vandalism, violence, terrorism, etc.).
Biological or chemical risk Biological or chemical accidents due to substance manipulation.
Others Other kinds of risk, e.g. electrical malfunctions. 
"VUIPSTTVDIBT#PZMFBOE)BHHFSUZ	
BOE(JVMJBOPUUJ
BOE,MBVTFS	
DMBJNUIBUUIFNPTUJNQPSUBOUSJTLGBDUPS
for large sporting events nowadays is the possibility of terror-
ist attacks. This is because the attack alter the normal course 
of an international football event, not only it would be able 
to fatally hurt attendees, but also it would deeply damage 
the image of the host country. Despite the terrorism, most of 
Spaniards consider football stadiums to be one of the most 
dangerous public spaces (ADT, 2012). Several authors (ADT, 
2012; Baker, Connaughton, Zhang, & Spengler, 2007; Ion, 
-FFTPO4NJUI4OPX1FBSTPO
FYQMBJO
UIBU UIFNBJO FYJTUJOH UISFBUT GPS TVDI FWFOUT BSF UIF PVU-
comes from verbal and physical violence from certain fans, 
as well as from the dangerous vandalism which sometimes 
occurs in these spaces.
If we analyse the most serious incident occurred inside the 
football stadiums, it is clear that the main causes of these in-
cidents were acts of violence and vandalism (anthropic risks). 
Also, they are indirectly enabled by inefficient crowd control 
measures and unsuitable preventive management by the or-
HBOJTFSTPGUIFTFFWFOUT	4IBNBOTPVSJ)BTIFNJ.JOBCBE
2010). For these reasons, it is possible to conclude that the 
DIJFGUISFBUXIJDIBêFDUT4QBOJTIGPPUCBMMTUBEJVNTBDUVBMMZ
comes from an thropic risks. Despite this, managers should 
not fail to prioritise other possible threats. 
In football, Spanish public authorities (local, regional and 
national) and Spanish football organisations (National Pro-
fessional Football League and Royal Football Federation of 
Spain) have approved some standards and obligatory meas-
ures in order to guarantee that any football club will always 
have a minimum level of security in their stadium, since 
JU IBQQFOFE JO PUIFS DPVOUSJFT BT 6OJUFE ,JOHEPN	)BMM
B
)PXFWFSBDDPSEJOHUP)BMM	B
PS5PVSDP3J-
ley and Swart (2002)these measures are not enough to pre-
vent anthropic risks; clubs must therefore implement new 
measures besides the obligatory ones (best practices). Thus, 
)BMM	
FTUBCMJTIDSJUJDBMTFDVSJUZEJNFOTJPOT	1FSJN-
eter Control, Access Control, Credentialing, Physical Protec-
tion Systems, Risk Management, Emergency Management, 
Recovery Procedures, Communications, Security Personnel, 
5SBJOJOH .PEFMMJOH BOE 4JNVMBUJPO BOE 8.% o 5PYJD
Materials Protection) divided in 134 standards in order to 
help the security responsible to identify the most important 
TFDVSJUZBTQFDUJOUIFFWFOUNBOBHFNFOU.PSFPWFS)BMMFU
al. (2009) highlighted the need that every stadium should 
perform their own auto-evaluation to guarantee a good level 
of security. 
)FODFUIFBJNTPGUIJTQSPKFDUBSF'JSTUMZFMBCPSBUFBUPPM
which will allow for an easy identification of the compliance 
grade of obligatory measures developed in the main leagues 
Spanish football stadiums (1st Division, 2nd Division and 2nd 
%JWJTJPO#
BOEëOBMMZUPDIFDLUIFFYUFOUUPXIJDIUIFTF
measures have already been enacted in various football sta-
diums.
Materials and Methods
Sample
%BUBXFSFDPMMFDUFEGSPNTJYGPPUCBMMTUBEJVNTUXPQFSFBDI
national division (1st Division, 2nd Division and 2nd Division 
#
 ɨFTF TUBEJVNT XFSF TFMFDUFE CFDBVTF UIFZ IBWF EJêFS-
FOUDIBSBDUFSJTUJDTUIFJEFBCFJOHUPTJYEJTUJODUBOEEJêFSFOU
situations (see Table 2 for more information).
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Table 2. Characteristic of the stadiums selected to this study.
Stadium Competition Characteristic
Stadium A: 2nd Division B A practically debutant Stadium in this division (as is the case of most stadiums belonging to this division).
Stadium B: 2nd Division B This stadium belongs to one of the clubs with the highest budget in 2nd Division B.
Stadium C: 2nd Division This stadium has been a short time in 2nd Division.
Stadium D: 2nd Division This stadium has been in 2nd Division many times, and it has also participated in the 1st Division.
Stadium E: 1st Division It is a traditional stadium of 1st%JWJTJPOCVUJUIBTMJUUMFFYQFSJFODFJO&VSPQFBOGPPUCBMMDPNQFUJUJPOT
Stadium F: 1st Division This stadium usually participates in European competitions.
Data-gathering tools and variables
Data were collected by means of a tool that was designed and 
made specifically for this study. It permits the identification 
of every obligatory security measure that football stadiums of 
the 1st Division, 2nd Division and 2nd Division B must develop. 
This tool is a dichotomic answer checklist (Yes/No) and it 
was created in compliance with the main Spanish legislations 
and regulations.
ɨSFF 1I% SFTFBSDIFST FYQFSUT JO UIF ëFME PG 4QPSU
Management and its Facilities, collaborated in the elabo-
SBUJPO PG UIJT DIFDLMJTU *O BEEJUJPO B TFDVSJUZ FYQFSU JO
sporting events with the highest Spanish qualifications su-
pervised in its creation. After several stages of preparation, 
this tool ended up having 150 items. These items had to be 
completed in two ways: 73 of them by observation and 77 
of them through interview with the security directors of 
the clubs. Finally, these items were divided in 10 categories. 
Table 3 shows the total number of items per category and 
many of these items must be collected by observation and 
through interviews. 
Table 3. Characteristics of the designed tool 
Checklist categories Nº items/ Category Nº observable items Nº Safety Officer items
Security Plans 15 0 15
Security Documentation 3 0 3
Access and Stay Criteria 28 28 0
Criteria Information 8 8 0
Measures and Protocols 36 12 24
Physical Means 17 12 5
)VNBO.FBOT 13 8 5
Technological Means 19 5 14
Services 3 0 3
)JHI3JTL.FBTVSFT 8 0 8
TOTAL 150 73 77
Validation of the tool
Since the check list was newly created, it was essential to 
gauge its reliability and validity. This was carried out as fol-
lows: 1) Familiarization of the researchers with this tool, so 
that they can use it as efficiently as possible when they assess 
UIFSFMFWBOUBTQFDUTPGBOZTUBEJVN	ɨFBGPSFNFOUJPOFEFY-
pert helped the researchers familiarize themselves with this 
UPPM

&YQFSUSFWJTJPOJOPSEFSUPTFDVSFUIBUUIFchecklist 
is clear and it has no room for ambiguous answers. Three 
EPDUPST GSPN UISFFEJêFSFOU4QBOJTIVOJWFSTJUJFT TQFDJBMJ[-
ing in sport management and facilities helped to revise the 
checklist. 3) Pilot studies being conducted in three football 
stadiums from 1st Division, 2nd Division and 2nd Division B 
respectively.
Finally, each stadium was analysed by two researchers, 
who collected the results for analysis. Therefore a triangula-
tion process was conducted in each case.
Procedure
The owners of the stadiums were contacted by e-mail, 
through the e-mail addresses available on their web sites. The 
characteristics of this study, as well as the requirements for 
148 J. López-Fernández et al.
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conducting it and the potential benefits for clubs participat-
JOHJOJUXFSFFYQMBJOFEJOUIFJOJUJBMDPNNVOJDBUJPO"MTP
data confidentiality were guaranteed at all times.
Once the participant clubs agreed to the terms, we pro-
ceeded to contact their Safety Officer (S.O.). The S.O. is the 
person responsible for the security of the stadiums at any 
HJWFONPNFOU FYDFQU PO UIFNBUDI EBZ 	XIFO UIF SFTQPO-
sibility passes to the General Coordinator of Security, who 
is attached to the public security services). The day for col-
lecting the data was agreed with the S.O. in the following 
way. Initially the researcher went to the stadium 90 minutes 
before a match in order to assess the ticketing sales process 
and the entrance of fans into the stadium. Secondly, 30-40 
minutes before the beginning of the match, researchers con-
tacted the S.O., who showed stadiums and their surrounding 
areas. Then, with the permission of the S.O., researchers pro-
ceeded with an analysis of the entrance of the fans and their 
accommodation in the stadium. Thirdly, the researchers and 
the S.O. completed the items on the checklist which could 
not be completed by means of observation. Fourthly, during 
the second halves of the matches, the researchers assessed the 
physical, human and technological means in situ, as well as 
the crowd control measures in order to assess how they were 
being managed. Fifthly, at the end of the matches, researcher 
BOBMZTFEUIFGBOFYJUQSPDFEVSFCPUIJOTJEFBOEPVUTJEFUIF
stadium. Finally, once there were no fans in the stadiums, 
researchers completed the other items which have not been 
collected previously, concluding with the triangulation pro-
cess conducted by the two researchers.
In the first five phases, researchers took photos to double-
check on the information collected.
Data analysis
Data analysis focused on statistical and descriptive calcula-
tions so as to calculate the percentage of compliance for each 
category, with regard to the checklist for each stadium and 
competition. The statistical software SPSS v. 20 was used to 
produce the results. Results are presented as mean and stand-
ard deviation. 
Results
ɨFSFTVMUTJMMVTUSBUFBIJHIEJêFSFODFBNPOHUIFTUVEJFTɨJT
EJêFSFODFDBOCFBQQSFDJBUFEJO5BCMFXIJDITIPXTUIFSF-
sults by means of elemental descriptive variables. It compares 
UIFNJOJNVNOVNCFSPGJUFNTBOEUIFNBYJNVNOVNCFSPG
items answered by the stadiums per category. 
Table 4. Descriptive Analysis of the results by category.
Categories Nº item / Category Nº minimum affirmative item Nº maximum affirmative item
Security Plans 15 1 15
Security Documentation 3 0 3
Access and Stay Criteria 28 15 28
Criteria Information 8 0 7
Measures and Protocols 36 11 36
Physical Means 17 7 17
)VNBO.FBOT 13 4 13
Technological Means 19 1 19
Services 3 0 3
)JHI3JTL.FBTVSFT 8 2 7
TOTAL 150 42 146
*OHFOFSBMUIFSFJTBIJHIEJêFSFODFBNPOHUIFTJYTUBEJVNT
however there are some categories which are being more per-
GPSNFEUIBOPUIFSTCZUIFTFTJYTUBEJVNTɨVTUIFDBUFHPSJFT
which have better percentage (mean ± standard deviation) of 
items fulfilled affirmatively were: access and permanence cri-
teria (94 ± 15%),services (83 ± 24%), measures and protocols 
(82 ± 25%),human means (81 ± 26%) and physical means 
(80 ± 29%). In contrast, the categories with less percentage 
of items answered affirmatively belonged to security plans 
(71 ± 37%),high risk measures (69 ± 24%), security docu-
mentation (67 ± 52%),technological means (62 ± 39%) and 
information of these criteria (44 ± 27%). The high value of 
the standard deviation in all cases shows that there are big 
EJêFSFODFTBNPOHUIFTJYBSFOBTBOEUIFSFJTOPIPNPHFOFJUZ
in the compliance of the obligatory measures.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of compliance of the stadiums 
overall and within each category. Also, the stadiums were 
analysed in terms of the competitions they were involved in.
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Figure 1. Average percentage of compliance for the checklist categories per division and the standard deviation.
In this Figure, the standard deviation shows how the grade of 
compliance from the stadiums was used for clubs in each di-
WJTJPOXJUIUXPGPPUCBMMBSFOBTQFSEJWJTJPOCFJOHFYBNJOFE
Thus stadiums used for teams in 2nd Division B (stadium A 
and stadium B) performed fewer obligatory security meas-
ures than the stadiums of teams in the other two divisions 
(52 ± 22% of accomplishment). Also, despite the fact that 
stadiums from the 1st Division (stadium E and stadium F) 
and the 2nd Division (stadium C and stadium D) are in pro-
fessional competition, none of them fulfilled all the obliga-
tory security measures set out in the Spanish legislation (85 
± 7%) for 2nd Division and (97 ± 0%) for 1st Division arenas.
Discussion
This checklist has been developed in order to comply with 
PCMJHBUPSZNFBTVSFTɨFSFGPSFUIFFYQFDUFESFTVMUTIPVMECF
PGDPNQMJBODFJOFWFSZTUBEJVN)PXFWFSOPOFPGUIF
TJYBSFOBTBDIJFWFEUIJT'VSUIFSNPSFTUBEJVNTPGUFBNTJO
lower divisions had worse results than those in higher divi-
sions.
"DDPSEJOH UP#PMF BOE)BHHFSUZ 	
)PVMJIBO BOE
(JVMJBOPUUJ 	
 BOE:V,MBVTFS BOE$IBO 	
 POF
of the key elements in the security of football matches is the 
future planning. Security plans are essential for these events 
150 J. López-Fernández et al.
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because they present information related to all participants 
in the security procedures, as well as guidelines of action if 
any accident occurs. After the incident which occurred in 
England, now a days the stadiums from the four main league 
NVTUIBWFB A4BGFUZ$FSUJëDBUF	)BMMB
 JO4QBJOBMM
GPPUCBMM DMVCT NVTU EFWFMPQ BU MFBTU TJY TFDVSJUZ QMBOT PS
protocols to protect their stadiums (Short Protocol Security, 
Basic Protocol Security, Reinforced Security Protocols, In-
ternal Codes [endorsed by the National Professional League 
of Football], Individual Risk Plans and Plan / Device / Op-
erative Security). These plans are often complementary to the 
Self-Protection Plan, which is only obligatory if the stadium 
can hold more than 20,000 people or if the public authori-
ties consider it necessary, as specified by Spanish government 
regulations and legislations. Despite the importance of the 
planning stages in security management, only three stadiums 
had implemented all of the security plans: two stadiums be-
longing to the first division and one belonging to the second 
division (stadiums D, E, and F). Of the other three, stadium 
A had the worst result (7%) because it had only developed 
the Plan / Device / Operative Security, while stadiums B and 
D did not achieve 70% of compliance. Finally, according to 
Spanish legislation stadiums A, B and C did not have to de-
velop a Self-Protection Plan, they were supposed to do this as 
an advisory measure (Gómez-Calvo, 2012).
Category of Security information checked whether the 
stadium had information about its fan groups, clubs or and 
radical factions, because this knowledge can be useful in se-
lecting the best security measures for the risk management of 
match-day (Mojet, 2005; Spaaij, 2013).Despite the impor-
tance of this element, the study showed that Stadiums A and 
C did not carry out any item of this category, whereas the 
other four stadiums fulfilled all of them.
As a side note, in order to avoid unacceptable behaviour 
within the stadiums (Category of access and stay criteria), 
football clubs have the legal right and obligation to develop 
measures against such possible situations, measures which 
must be followed by any fan who wants to enter the stadium 
or be present at a match. If they do not follow these criteria 
UIFZDBOCFFYQFMMFEGSPNUIFGBDJMJUJFT	8BSSFO;VSBXTLJ

 "MM TUBEJVNT IBE DPNQMJFEXJUI PG UIFTF FY-
DFQUGPSTUBEJVN"BUPOMZ)PXFWFS4QBOJTIDMVCTEP
OPUHFOFSBMMZ JOGPSNUIFJS GBOTBCPVUTFDVSJUZBTFêFDUJWFMZ
as they should do. In this category, the club with the best 
performance belonged to 2nd Division B (stadium A 0%, sta-
dium B 75%, stadium C 25%, stadium D 50%, stadium E 
63% and stadium F 50%). Information is the first means of 
security since it is the base for the rest of the security meas-
ures (Category of Criteria information). Placing informative 
posters at the entrances, access points and interior of the sta-
dium might avoid possible risks and improper behaviour by 
fans, especially more moderate ones, since then fans would 
LOPXXIBU JT BMMPXFEBOEXIBU JTOPU	)BMM)BMM FU
al., 2009).
In the security management of football matches, five key 
measures and protocols are required to ensure a successful 
security management. All of them belong to Category of 
Measures and Protocols of the checklist and they are useful 
for crowd control throughout the match (Abbott & Geddie, 
)BMMFUBM.BEFOTFO&DL
8JUIUIF
FYDFQUJPOPGTUBEJVN"FWFSZBSFOBTDPSFEIJHIFSUIBO
JOUIJTDBUFHPSZ)PXFWFSEVFUPUIFJNQPSUBODFPGUIJTDBU-
egory and the diversity of the items, this was divided into five 
steps in order to facilitate understanding: 
Revisions and checks before the match: These are necessary 
so that every stadium is in a suitable condition for holding an 
event (Madensen & Eck, 2008). Every arena had complied 
with and enforced all the measures defined by current laws 
BOESFHVMBUJPOTFYDFQUTUBEJVN"	XIJDIIBEPOMZDPNQMJFE
XJUIPOFPGUIFTJYJUFNT

Access management: The importance of this resides in foot-
ball clubs preventing access of inappropriate people into their 
arenas. It is therefore the first line of security on a match day 
(Madensen & Eck, 2008; Mason, 2014). Only stadium A did 
not present good access management as it did not compile 
personal records, capacity control was not performed and its 
tickets could be easily counterfeited. 
Permanency management: Crowd control is important in 
order to avoid the presence of anthropic risks. The main func-
tions of permanence management are to allot and locate fan 
HSPVQT JOEJêFSFOUBSFBTPG UIFTUBEJVNBOENPOJUPS UIFN
once they enter the stadium. Only in this way there is a chance 
to reduce the permanence measures of fans break in. If they 
break in, the possible culprits can be identified(Madensen & 
Eck, 2008; Mason, 2014). All the arenas analysed had com-
QMJFEXJUIUIFTFNFBTVSFTFYDFQU4UBEJVN"
Stadium evacuation: The evacuation of arenas has not 
been historically common in Spain (last time was in 2004), 
but the Spanish legislation states that football clubs must be 
ready for the total or partial evacuation of a stadium. This is 
a paramount task since the number of attendees at football 
matches usually ranks in the thousands and of the procedure 
GPSFNFSHFODZDSPXEDPOUSPM JTFYUSFNFMZDPNQMJDBUFE	.B-
son, 2014; Mwanuhehere, 2009). Stadium A did not comply 
with any of the obligatory measures. In addition, the emer-
gency drills being used to evacuate an arena need to be very 
efficient. Each participant in the security process needs to un-
derstand their roles in this process clearly. Stadiums B, D and 
E had not really ensured that this was possible (Mwanuhe-
here, 2009). 
Post-match report: According to the Royal Decree 
203/2010, this report should include details of all incidents 
that occur during a football match. Therefore, this report is 
useful in analysing the security measures used in this match 
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BOEUPJNQSPWFUIFNGPSUIFGVUVSF"MMTJYBSFOBTXFSFHJWFO
this report once their matches finished.
Even if some stadiums carry out these five measures, se-
curity accidents can happen if security is not managed op-
timally. For that reason, physical, human and technological 
means are essential in this situation (Mason, 2014). These 
means (assessed in categories Physical means, human means 
BOE UFDIOPMPHJDBMNFBOT
QSFTFOU JNQPSUBOUEJêFSFODFTCF-
tween divisions, because higher divisions have better means 
than lower divisions.
The main goal of physical security means is the crowd 
DPOUSPMUISPVHIUIFTFQBSBUJPOPGEJêFSFOUGBOHSPVQT1IZTJ-
cal means are also useful to ensure a smooth movement of 
GBOT BOE TFHNFOU UIF TUBEJVN JOUP BSFBT GPSEJêFSFOU GBOT
Moreover, they are important because the distribution of hu-
man and technological means is based on them. Therefore, if 
there are better physical means in a stadium, the chance of an 
BOUISPQJDSJTLPDDVSSJOHXJMMCFMPXFS	)BMM.BEFOT-
en & Eck, 2008). stadiums A (29%) and B (65%) had low 
compliance results because they did not have an Organisa-
tional Control Unit (where the main security managers must 
be during the match) and according to Madensen and Eck 
(2008)this is one of the most important security areas in a 
football arena. Also, stadiums A and B had no turnstiles, no 
physical fan separation and the seats were not numbered. 
)VNBONFBOTBSFJNQPSUBOUCFDBVTFUIFZQPTJUJWFMZDPO-
trol physical and technological means and they have more 
impact on crowd control than other means, as they are insuf-
ficient on their own without humans to control them. More-
over, human means are in direct contact with the attendees at 
a football match and therefore they can help persuade them 
not to take part in inappropriate behaviour. The problem is 
UIFDPTUBUXIJDIUIFZGVODUJPO)PXFWFSUPSFEVDFJOWFTU-
ment without this being detrimental to the quality of security, 
clubs can hire volunteers to help security members in their 
XPSLQMBDFT	(JVMJBOPUUJ,MBVTFS)BMMC
Madensen & Eck, 2008). Stadium A (31%) did not have the 
main human means such as a General Security Coordina-
tor, security watchers or seat attendants, whereas stadium B 
(77%)only lacked a General Security Coordinator and seat 
attendants. The remaining stadiums had every human means, 
but the numbers of security workers were fewer in stadiums 
C (85%) and D (92%) than in stadiums E and F (100%), 
since their budgets allowed for the hiring of more personnel.
Technological means can provide the highest quality se-
curity service, because nowadays they can give important in-
GPSNBUJPOJOSFBMUJNF)PXFWFSUIFZOFFEIVNBONFBOTUP
be successful. Technological means can control football fans 
more accurately, without them feeling observed. In addition, 
these means have a good dissuasive power and their proper 
management can help identify inappropriate behaviour more 
easily. The main technological resources are Close Circuit 
Television (CCTV), electronic turnstiles, communication 
OFUXPSLTBOEBDPVTUJDTZTUFN	(JVMJBOPUUJ,MBVTFS
,MBVTFS  .BEFOTFO  &DL 
 'VSUIFSNPSF BMM
these elements must be integrated into an encompassing sys-
tem which needs to be managed at the Organisational Con-
trol Unit. The arenas in the 1st Division usually have higher 
investment in this means than stadiums from lower divisions, 
TJODFUIFJSCJHHFSCVEHFUTNBZFYQMBJOXIZTUBEJVNT&BOE'
had complied with 100% of the security regulations, whereas 
stadium D only reached 80% and Stadiums A, B and C less 
than 50%. Stadium A (5%) lacks CCTV, turnstiles and even 
communication networks. Stadium B (42%) lacked turnstiles 
and an integrated system with all the technological means of 
security (if it did, its CCTV and acoustic system would not 
be so deficient). Stadium C (42%) has neither CCTV system 
nor an integrated technological system. Finally, stadium D 
(85%), despite having all the technological means, does not 
implement a regulation-compliant CCTV system. 
The main problem that concern football matches is that 
OPUBMMPGUIFNBSFBêFDUFECZUIFTBNFSJTLTUIFSFGPSFOPU
all of their problems can be assessed in the same way. In that 
sense, those matches that are perceived as being more impor-
tant by the fans (such as the league, the European compe-
titions, the promotion and relegation, etc.) usually have an 
increased risk of accidents. For those reasons, some football 
NBUDIFTBSFDBUFHPSJTFEBT)JHIFTU3JTL.BUDIFT 	DBUFHPSZ
PG)JHI SJTLNFBTVSFT
 BOEOFXTFDVSJUZNFBTVSFTOFFE UP
be implemented that complement the standard procedures in 
order to guarantee crowd control and the general safety of all 
QBSUJFTQSFTFOUBUUIFTUBEJVN	)BMMB.BEFOTFO&DL
4QBBJK
/POFPGUIFTJYTUBEJVNTIBEQVUBMMPG
these obligatory security measures in place (stadium A 25%, 
stadium B 63 %, stadium C and D 75% and stadium E and 
F 88%), but all of them had implemented some additional 
security for such matches. In such a situation, all the stadi-
ums could strengthen their ticket systems and control access 
to the stadium more thoroughly, yet the least used measure 
of security was the monitoring of attendants. Finally, there 
XFSFNBOZEJêFSFODFTCFUXFFOUIFTJYTUBEJVNTBMMPGUIFN
had developed other measures in order to ensure a high secu-
rity outcome for any kind of football match, regardless of its 
importance. In addition, according to the security directors, 
these measures of well-being are more important than the 
optimal obligatory measures.
To conclude, despite the fact that obligatory measures 
were identical for the three divisions (1st Division, 2nd Divi-
sion and 2nd%JWJTJPO#
FWFSZTUBEJVNIBWFEJêFSFOUDIBS-
acteristics (in terms of arena capacity, number of supporters, 
CVEHFU FUD
ɨVTXF BHSFFXJUI)BMM 	)BMM B)BMM
et al., 2009)that every single stadium should performs their 
own auto-evaluation per each risk factor. Therefore, this tool 
can be useful for them in order to guarantee they accomplish 
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with all obligatory measures, but they should adapt it to their 
own reality. Finally, the level of compliance of the obligatory 
measures in Spanish football stadiums is not homogeneous; 
since the stadiums belonging to 1st Division clubs are close 
UPDPNQMZFêFDUJWFMZXJUIBMMUIFTFDVSJUZNFBTVSFTɨBUJT
why if football authorities (public and private) ensure that 
all football arenas must apply all of the obligatory security 
measures, they should do so in proportion to their budgetary 
restrictions and specific security threats.
This study has developed a dichotomic tool with 150 items 
JOPSEFSUPJEFOUJGZUIFFYUFOUPGDPNQMJBODFXJUIPCMJHBUPSZ
security measures by Spanish football stadiums. This tool has 
CFFOVTFEJOTJYTUBEJVNTɨFVTFPGUIJTUPPMDBOIFMQGPPU-
ball stadiums to fulfil all the obligatory measures,no matter 
what division their clubs are in. On the other hand, none of 
the stadiums of the 2nd Division B achieved 75% compliance, 
TIPXJOHUIBUUIFSFJTBHSFBUEJêFSFODFCFUXFFOUIJTDPNQFUJ-
tion and the other two. Also, the 2nd Division had only 85% 
PGDPNQMJBODFCFDBVTFUIFSFBSFHSFBUEJêFSFODFTCFUXFFOUIF
analyses of stadiums. Finally, even though the 1st Divisionis 
one of the most important competitions in the world and 
achieved 97% compliance, its stadiums still need to improve 
their security measures.
The main aspects that Spanish football stadiums need 
to improve (especially those in the 2nd Division B and 2nd 
Division) are security planning, developing more security 
plans, security documentation and collecting information 
about fans and attendees. Also, more investment in techno-
logical means, physical means and other measures to con-
trol behaviour at matches will be needed in the future to 
deal with potentially high risk situations. Finally, despite 
the fact that the best result obtained has been in the cat-
egory of access and stay criteria, the stadiums should in-
form fans and attendees more clearly about how they must 
behave at any particular moment, as well as they should 
improve the ways to guarantee the compliances of these ac-
cess and stay criteria.
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